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ABSTRACT 
In 2011 William Hague, then British Foreign Secretary, authorized a Special Forces team to 
enter Libya and attempt to contact rebels opposed to Muammar Gaddafi in the unfolding civil 
war. However, its members were detained by the rebels, questioned and ejected from the 
country. This article puts the literature on public policy failures into dialogue with that on 
covert action as a tool of foreign policy. It asks: why did this not develop into a fully-fledged 
policy fiasco when journalists and politicians alike judged it to have been a major error of 
judgement on Hague’s part? Using narrative analysis of the contemporary reporting of this 
incident, we argue that the government – possessing the advantage of information asymmetry 
accruing from operational secrecy – was ultimately able to win the battle of narratives in a 
frame contestation process. The study of information asymmetry can enhance the recently 
revivified research into foreign policy failures. 
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Introduction 
 
Covert action is one of the most controversial means of executing government policy, a high-
risk option fraught with inherent dangers. Given this, it might be assumed all too easily that 
whenever covert actions turn sour, which many do, apparent failure can swiftly escalate into 
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full-blown fiasco. However, even if a covert action is judged to have failed, secrecy and 
operational security may well prevent failure developing into fiasco. This creates an interesting 
paradox, wherein some of the most controversial foreign policy ventures that go wrong can 
avoid becoming fiascos when less controversial domestic public policies may well do (see the 
number of domestic ‘blunders’ cited in King and Crewe 2013). The goal of this article is to 
investigate the narrative construction of covert action fiascos, a fiasco ‘type’ which has been 
sorely neglected in the emerging research programme on foreign policy fiascos.  
Our choice of case study is Britain’s attempt to insert a secret team into Libya in March 
2011, at the height of the Arab Spring. We investigate the ways in which participants in 
accountability forums in politics and the media attempted to construct a fiasco, but ultimately 
failed to do so. Our argument is that Foreign Secretary William Hague – the character in the 
drama deemed most blameworthy by most commentators – was narrowly able to avoid the 
perceived failure becoming a fiasco. This, we find, was the result both of Hague’s actions in 
defusing fiasco narratives and of contingency surrounding shifting media agendas. Most 
significantly, however, was the clear information asymmetry at work. The secrecy of the 
operation prevented critics from mobilizing behind an unassailable fiasco narrative built on 
firm empirical foundations, that might have gained traction in the public mind. Moreover, the 
government ran an effective message management campaign. It downplayed the salience of the 
operation while stressing the imperative of a bold and united British response to the Arab 
Spring. Helpfully for Hague, the government’s wider Libyan strategy did not at this point prove 
politically contentious. Ultimately, therefore, the Foreign Secretary survived in office, was 
backed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet colleagues not known to be naturally sympathetic 
to him (a materially significant political element) and, arguably most importantly, he managed 
to win the battle of ‘frames’ by having his version of events come to be accepted as the 
dominant one. For these reasons, we deem this episode to have been an attempted fiasco 
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construction that failed. The article offers novel insights into the conceptual and practical 
challenges associated with the study of covert action fiascos. Even more than this, however, it 
helps us appreciate the challenges of studying foreign and domestic policy fiascos more widely. 
 The article proceeds in three parts. In the first part we review the two literatures we 
bring together: the public policy evaluation literature and that on covert action, with a view to 
explaining the benefits to be garnered from linking the two. The second part defines the key 
terms such as ‘fiasco’ and shows empirically the opportunities and challenges of studying 
covert action using this conceptual toolkit. The third part presents our method and discusses 
the main evidence from the Libya case study. The conclusion reflects on the key contributions 
our article makes to the recently revivified research into foreign policy failures, and to the study 
of lessons learned from foreign policy failures.  
 
 
State of the art: Public policy analysis and foreign policy failures 
 
This article benefits from putting two sets of literature into conversation, with the aim of 
advancing a major new body of research into foreign policy failures. The first is the public 
policy evaluation literature focusing on the study of fiascos and policy failures, of all types, 
strengths and legacies. Since the publication of Mark Bovens and Paul ‘t Hart’s seminal work 
(1996; 2001), this field has been dominated by discussions of domestic policy fiascos written 
with a public administration audience in mind. Typical examples include ‘overspend’ fiascos 
such as the UK Millennium Dome project and the building of the Sydney Opera House; failures 
to deal with crises, such as the UK government’s response to the BSE outbreak in the late 1990s; 
and high profile tragedies, such as the Hillsborough football stadium disaster in April 1989. 
These have all been judged fiascos either of overall policy, programme or procedurally (see 
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McConnell 2010a; McConnell 2016; Howlett 2012). Ongoing work developing a framework 
for understanding and explaining policy failure has been complemented by close analysis of 
policy successes – again largely from a domestic public policy perspective – which have 
tightened our understanding of the obverse case of the policy fiasco (see for example Marsh 
and McConnell 2010; McConnell 2010b).  
The second body of literature deployed in this article is that on covert action. The 
historiography in this field has, hitherto, been dominated by linear narratives and country-
specific case studies (the standard bearer on UK covert action being Aldrich 2001). Much of 
this belongs to a pioneering first generation corpus using archival research to reveal operations. 
Accompanying this, there are many works considering specific covert actions deemed to have 
failed, notably the Bay of Pigs (Rasenberger 2012) and the Iran-Contra affair (Byrne 2014). 
These are all insightful studies. However, they lack a comprehensive theoretical framework 
resting on a sophisticated analysis of causation and evaluation of the material from a political 
science perspective – one that would enable a critically informed appreciation of the nature and 
scale of the alleged failure and/or fiasco. Particularly marked in this literature is a tendency to 
objectivize the failure as a given, without attention to the constructed and politicized nature of 
the events in question.  
It is, therefore, a welcome development that public policy and foreign policy scholars 
have recently begun working collaboratively to reignite the study of foreign policy failures. 
The fruits of this bridge building include a spate of fiascos workshops and conference panels 
that resulted in the 2016 Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy and a new 
edited collection on foreign policy mistakes (Kruck et al. 2017). These have aimed to move 
forward both sub-disciplines via reflection on the nature of policy failure (Bovens and ‘t Hart 
2016) and, on the empirical side, by ‘bringing public policy and foreign policy together’ 
(Oppermann and Spencer 2016a). Examples include articles on the 2011 German abstention 
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from a United Nations Security Council vote on intervention in Libya (Oppermann and Spencer 
2016b) and the 2013 British parliamentary vote against military action in Syria (Gaskarth 2016).  
However, much of this literature still, variously, ignores, misunderstands or neglects 
policies involving secret intelligence. Bovens and ‘t Hart offer a cursory mention of 
intelligence when discussing typologies of failure, arguing that it falls in the ‘tragedy’ category 
in so far as ‘accomplishments can often not be publicized, [and] may suffer from a similar lack 
of community and political appreciation’ (2016: 658). This is fair, but overly simplistic in that 
it assumes programmatic success and does not account for failure. Likewise, Marsh and 
McConnell (2010b: 575) briefly discuss the contested success or failure of extraordinary 
rendition but consider neither secrecy nor how the operations came to light in the first place. 
Nonetheless, this new agenda provides a very welcome antidote to the benign neglect that 
previously characterized the relationship between scholars in the two fields. It was also a cue 
to our article, which adds covert action, with its inherent secrecy and controversy, into the mix.  
Bringing covert action, as part of broader foreign policy activity, into dialogue with the 
public policy literature is valuable in at least three ways. First, scholars of International 
Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis have long been interested in the impact of various agent-
oriented factors (see Brummer 2016; Beasley 2016; Allison and Zelikow 1999) on decisions 
affecting international politics – and crucially how policy-makers learn lessons from these 
episodes (see Daddow 2011; Howlett 2012; Mumford 2015; Cormac et al. 2016). However, 
and this is especially the case for those studying covert action, scholars have not yet travelled 
very far down the road of conceptualizing and categorizing analytically all the different types 
of mistake/blunder/failure/fiasco (for an attempt using US cases see Walker and Malici 2011). 
Such categorization is necessary to provide fine-grained understandings of how failure is 
identified, labelled and constructed through various forms of political and discursive 
contestation. By extension, this will generate more nuanced lessons, which are especially 
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required in an era when lesson-learning is the main way in which publics engage with foreign 
policy debates (see for instance The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 2016). Moreover, covert action, 
and the inherent secrecy therein, problematizes the lesson learning process of extracting visible 
information which can offer credible and generalizable lessons. The case study below is 
particularly relevant because it highlights how learning can occur from successful message 
management and fiasco containment, contributing novel information in a field dominated by 
learning from apparent failure.  
Secondly, and linked to this, analysis of the domestic political settings within which 
foreign policy fiascos are constructed, and blame apportioned, casts much needed light on the 
interconnectedness between national and international politics.1  For foreign policy fiascos, no 
less than domestic fiascos, are only foreign policy fiascos when deemed to be so by domestic 
political audiences and commentators. Studying covert action contributes to this strand in so 
far as operations, when revealed, raise debates about democratic legitimacy, transparency, and 
oversight. In particular, it provides a vivid illustration of the ways in which external activity by 
a state can cause problems not only abroad (‘over there’ for ‘others’) but domestically too.   
The third value of this research agenda is that it draws attention to the methodological 
challenges of conducting fiasco research. A lot but not all the current research in what is an 
encouragingly pluralist field is, broadly, interpretivist in nature (see Yanow 2000; Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow 2012; Lynch 2014; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014; Bevir and Daddow 
2015). There is an argument to be made, however, that the distinctions between positivist and 
post-positivist research have been overdrawn; this is clearly evident in the fiascos literature. 
For example, positivist accounts do not deny an element of interpretation when evaluating 
public policies. Post-positivists stress the constructed nature of fiascos. However, they do not 
claim that anything can be said about a supposed public policy failure (echoing Oppermann 
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and Spencer 2016a: 649-50) or that everything is discourse (Howarth et al. 2000: 3). Valid and 
reliable empirical evidence is the essential bedrock to both modes of inquiry.  
Fiascos research is very well placed to tap into this meta-debate in the philosophy of 
social science, as well as those that occur within these traditions (Bevir 2002; Bevir and Rhodes 
2016). Alan McConnell explains this point very well (2016:677), when he remarks that despite 
the formidable methodological challenges facing the fiasco analyst, this is not a challenge that 
should be shirked because they ‘mirror classic methodological differences in the social sciences 
– whether the phenomenon being studied is a matter of “fact”, interpretation or both’. Covert 
action, as discussed in the next section, starkly demonstrates the methodological conundrums 
facing all fiasco researchers. We develop a rigorous method of extracting and reporting the 
data which can travel to all types of alleged domestic and foreign policy fiasco. Importantly, 
our method enables us to explore alleged covert action failures without having to wait decades 
for the release of official documents, giving it real currency and immediacy. All in, therefore, 
our article advances significantly the cumulative research agenda across the board, 
methodologically, theoretically and empirically. We will now reflect in more detail on the 
nature of these challenges as seen from the perspective of the covert action fiasco analyst. 
 
Covert action: The challenge for fiasco construction 
  
Covert action is a state’s attempts to interfere in the affairs of another in a plausibly deniable 
manner. It generally falls into one of four categories: political action, economic action, 
propaganda, and paramilitary action. By definition, covert action entails a controversial set of 
practices in international relations. When things go awry, the potential for fiasco narratives to 
emerge would seem to be very high. 
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The fiasco – and broader policy evaluation – literature offers a useful framework for 
assessing the scope and limits of covert action as foreign policy choice. Mistakes and failures, 
although contested, are part of the daily life of any bureaucracy (McConnell 2016: 667). They 
are multifaceted, ranging in severity, cause and degree of politicization. They also come in 
many forms, including disasters, blunders, and catastrophes (see Gray 1998: 8; Moran 2001: 
416-7; King and Crewe 2013: 4). Like success, failure is a subjective label ‘applied by 
stakeholders and observers’ (Bovens and ‘t Hart 2016: 654; see also McConnell 2016: 667-
684). Fiasco is a type of failure, and not all failures become fiascos. A policy fiasco is ‘a 
negative event that is perceived by a socially and politically significant group of people in the 
community to be at least partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy failures of public 
policymakers’ (Bovens and ‘t Hart 2016: 653-4). Generic failure, by contrast, does not 
necessarily contain an assumption that individual actions are at fault (McConnell 2016: 668). 
We therefore posit a crucial distinction between fiasco and failure: although both are subject 
to debate and contestation, fiascos are more politicized. Fiascos arise out of political or 
reputational failure as well as programmatic or decisional/implementation failure (Bovens and 
‘t Hart 2016: 653-4, 658; Marsh and McConnell 2010: 571). Through discursive construction, 
they are visible, significant, public, and involve the attribution of blame.  
Fiascos therefore ‘share a common process’ or are ‘marked by the existence of 
particular patterns of beliefs about events’ (Gray 1998: 8). The process, driven by the 
interpretative struggles therein, tends to involve four themes. Firstly, the perceived failing must 
be articulated by policy evaluation stakeholders to have been visible and immediate. Secondly, 
observers need to be able to identify causation. This process, as Michael Howlett (2012: 543) 
has pointed out, is heightened when failures are deemed to have been predictable and avoidable. 
Thirdly, observers have to be able to explain and interpret agents’ behaviour: characterization 
and identification of the main players in the drama is important. According to Bovens et al 
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(2006: 323), ‘astute players of the evaluation game will therefore attempt to produce facts and 
images that suit their aims.’ Such frame contestation leads to a fourth component featuring 
within the articulated discourse: blame allocation. The media offers a key arena in which this 
takes place, not least because it is by and through the media that fiasco frame contestations play 
out. By providing a ‘pivotal forum for political sense-making,’ it can be integral to explaining 
why some failures enter the limelight and escalate into fiascos (Bovens et al 1998: 48). 
For the covert action analyst, these already challenging difficulties are magnified 
hugely. Ontologically, it is difficult to ascertain (usually shifting) policy goals against which 
to measure outcomes, and if we do not know what the goal was, how can we say that it failed, 
or indeed succeeded (McConnell 2016: 669)? Owing to the inherent secrecy of covert 
operations, it is very tricky to identify and label a covert operation a failure in the first place, 
let alone politicize it, allocate blame and construct a resonant fiasco narrative. Why? Because 
secrecy restricts the information flows required to emplot a credible story about what occurred 
and therefore limits the capacity of outside commentators to seek out the causes of any alleged 
failure. There is the further complicating issue of short-term success versus long-term failure, 
a feature so prevalent in covert action that it even has its own term: ‘blowback’. CIA aid to the 
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the 1980s is perhaps the most widely-cited example, in so 
far as it created a power vacuum inside Afghanistan which Al Qaeda could later exploit (Prados 
2009: 293). Problems assessing impact and agency also impede policy evaluation. The nature 
of covert action, which often involves deniably supporting existing forces, renders it difficult 
to judge the effect of a particular policy, even if we know the original goal. For example, 
historians still debate the relative influence of CIA activity versus pre-existing internal agency 
in such cases as the 1953 Iranian coup, unrest in Congo in the early 1960s, and the 1973 Chilean 
coup (see Bayandor 2010; Daugherty 2009: 7; Haslam 2005; Devine 2014).  
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Even when an operation – which stakeholders accuse of having failed – does come to 
light, secrecy and deliberate obfuscation hide details which are essential to the construction of 
fiasco narratives. Moreover, the passage of time between failure and public knowledge – and 
the slow and sporadic dripping of revelations by historians working on archival records – has 
long prevented the necessary politicization for covert action failure to become fiasco. By the 
time a story of failure finally breaks, those in office may have died, events lack a temporal 
immediacy, and there is little media or public appetite to rake over ‘old ground’. Anglo-
American attempts to overthrow the Albanian government from 1949, for example, are now 
seen to have badly failed; yet the operation lacked visibility and spatial immediacy, rendering 
it difficult for anyone outside of a small circle to construct failure let alone fiasco. And, over 
60 years on, historians are still debating the chronology of events and where to assign blame 
(see Jeffery 2011: 715; MacIntyre 2014: 120).  
Even confronted with these obstacles, covert action fiascos have been said to have 
occurred. We suggest that there is a discernible pattern in the narrative construction of each. In 
line with public policy literature discussed above, the process includes, firstly, a perceived 
visible, immediate, and consequential failure, with sufficient momentum to sustain a fiasco 
narrative. Second, there is a transfer of information, often through an accountability forum such 
as the media, which challenges government monopoly on information, and out of which 
stakeholders are keen to make political capital. Third, there is an attempt to identify the source 
of the alleged failure, usually spanning one or more levels of analysis: individual decision-
makers, a wing of the bureaucracy, or perhaps the strategic foreign policy outlook of the 
government in toto. The identification of the source(s) or origin(s) of the perceived negative 
outcome a vital function of the fiasco narrative that includes: causation, (un)avoidability, 
uncertainty about goals and so on. Each ingredient is weighed differently by participants 
arguing about whether and how far the operation was a fiasco. The core factor in each of the 
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above is access to information: without details of the operation, neither failure nor fiasco can 
be constructed. This is one of the major findings from our case study data, as detailed below.  
To put some empirical flesh on these patterns, we can look to the 1961 Bay of Pigs 
fiasco, when the CIA supported Cuban exiles in an attempted revolution, or the 1997 Khaled 
Mashal fiasco, when Israel’s secret service, Mossad, botched the assassination of a Hamas 
leader (Kahana 2007: 65). Both were visible and immediate: the sponsoring state was quickly 
identified and the operation sparked much public discussion. Both were successfully articulated 
as being sufficiently consequential in terms of impact on policy and prestige to warrant the 
resources necessary to detailed investigative journalism (on America see Wyden 1979: 295, 
305; Johnson 1964: 220; Haefele 2001: 77-8); on Israel see Cowell: 1997). 
Both cases also involved a transfer of information to the accountability forum of the 
press, which challenged the government’s monopoly over information and allowed 
stakeholders to politicize failure and construct the fiasco. Regarding the Bay of Pigs, the press 
already had the details, via a series of leaks, before the operation happened, but had been 
persuaded by policy-makers not to publish for the sake of national security. Following the 
perceived failure, senior administration officials, including the President and the director of the 
CIA, gave numerous unattributable briefings, which involved much finger pointing and blame 
avoidance (Barrett 2016: 6-23). Similarly, Mossad briefed reporters with off-the-record details, 
whilst the Israeli Prime Minister attempted to make intelligence a scapegoat (Pateman, 2003: 
154). This permitted characterization and the identification of agency, both of which are 
integral to fiasco emplotment but, which, usually remain obscured regarding covert action. 
The US’s failed Iranian hostage rescue in 1980 and the 1986 Iran-Contra affair further 
illustrate some of the ingredients essential to a successful fiasco construction.2 In both instances, 
the government lost its monopoly over information, opening the way for the emergence of 
credible fiasco narratives via politicization of the issue, public discussions about magnitude 
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and consequence, and the allocation of blame (on Iran-Contra see Brody and Shapiro 1989: 
353-369; on the rescue attempt see Smith 1985: 117-123; Holloway et al 1980). In all the cases 
explored above, the transfer of information was key. When the transfer took place, the 
government suddenly found itself at a disadvantage regarding covert action compared to overt 
action: issues of secrecy and operational security, asset protection and potential diplomatic 
fallout can constrain the government from constructing a compelling counter-narrative. The 
case study data presented in the next section shows vividly how and why these are the essential 
ingredients in a successful fiasco construction. 
 
Information asymmetry and the battle of narratives over Libya3  
 
Fiasco authors – journalists, historians and public policy analysts – tell fiasco stories in 
narrative form, through which they give the events meaning for readers (White 1992: 4; Gunn 
2006: 37-38; Klotz and Lynch 2007: 45-51). Consensus around certain core ‘facts of the matter’ 
results in the repetition of keywords and phrases that offer themselves up as empirical patterns 
identifiable in the data (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 53-54). These patterns delimit a discourse ‘field’ 
that helps structure – but does not determine – what can and cannot be said on a given issue 
(see Howarth et al. 2000: 15; Wetherell et al. 2009: 7-8). The more basic facts that can be 
established, and the greater the certainty about those facts, the more likely it is that a particular 
narrative interpretation will establish credibility amidst the ‘noise’ of counter-narratives and 
rival emplotments.  
The pertinent feature of fiasco narratives is that they are constructed very clearly as 
morality plays. This should not be a surprise because as White remarks (1975: 14): it ‘seems 
possible to conclude that every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the 
desire to moralize the events of which it treats’ (see also Daddow 2006). Fiasco narratives thus 
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contain two interconnected features that make them fertile sources of evidence about the 
politics of fiasco construction (drawing on Oppermann and Spencer 2016b: 691). First, they 
emplot the reasons why a failure occurred. Second, they pinpoint who or what was to blame 
for the failure and debate what could have been done differently to avoid the incidents or 
decisions that led to the (usually negative) outcome.   
The method selected for the analysis of the coverage of Hague’s Libyan venture was, 
therefore, a close study of media narratives, unpacked using discourse analysis of the relevant 
news reporting and opinion pieces. The research questions that guided our extraction of the 
data were all geared to investigating the setting, characterization and emplotment of the media 
reporting: (i) who were the main actors in the Libyan episode, where were they operating, and 
what were they doing? (ii) what was the magnitude of the failure – if any – and who was to 
blame for any alleged failings? (iii) what were the resistances to the fiasco narratives and how 
successful were they? We studied the coverage from the day the story broke on 6 March 2011 
and tracked how it unfolded for the next ten days. Searches on Lexis delivered nearly 150 
newspaper articles, and these were accompanied by a study of writing in the Financial Times 
which did not feature on the database. We did not study the broadcast media on this occasion 
for reasons of space, but it would be interesting to assess how far the same stories fed television 
and radio coverage of Hague’s Libyan venture. 
When the story of the British detainees in Libya broke on 6 March 2011 it was evident 
that, lacking an official account of what had happened – via a press conference, interview, or 
other political statement – journalists had a desperately difficult job establishing what had 
transpired, especially who was involved. Phase One of the media coverage was thus driven by 
factual uncertainty regarding both cast (who was involved in the story?) and the equipment 
they had on them at the time of capture. The Sunday Times, which broke the story, put the 
figure at ‘soldiers – up to eight men’ captured escorting a ‘junior diplomat’ through rebel-held 
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territory in the east of the country (Jaber 2011). Others followed suit but there was little 
consensus about the numbers involved or their identities with speculation covering soldiers, 
SAS, diplomats, and MI6 agents. There was only marginally more agreement on the equipment 
the seized men were carrying, and the reporting again spoke to the James Bond-style nature of 
the mission. Sensationalized speculation stretched to fake passports, maps, communications 
equipment, and weapons.  
 After a couple of days (some overlap aside) the information-gathering phase gave way 
to Phase Two: blame attribution. Attempts at fiasco construction were built on shaky empirical 
foundations because characterization had been so weak in Phase One. There was, however, 
early and widespread agreement that something had gone wrong with Hague’s Libyan 
operation, the failure of which was deemed visible and controversial. A sense of government 
‘cover up’ was also in the air. In line with the aforementioned ingredients identified for a 
successful fiasco construction, someone had to be to blame. Coding for the adjectives used to 
describe the mission revealed around 20 negative descriptors of varying degrees of strength, 
including failure, bungle, and, indeed, fiasco. Managing the consequences of this heavily 
negative verdict became the government’s main task over the next few days. The success of its 
resistance narratives and message management would determine the future of Hague himself 
and the credibility of the Cameron government’s Libyan and wider foreign policy. 
The consequences of any perceived failure were most grave for Hague himself, with 
the Prime Minister and government as a whole also implicated. Only a tiny portion of the flak 
was taken by then head of MI6, John Sawers (Sherwood 2011). This was very much a story 
centring on the ‘Westminster bubble’. Three facets of the media coverage are noteworthy in 
this respect: the information vacuum; the sense that the British lacked control over what 
information was coming out of Libya; and the debate about Hague’s role and responsibility.  
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First, central government personnel, constrained by secrecy and operational security, 
initially came forward with very limited information. One national and some regional 
newspapers picked up on comments from Defence Secretary Liam Fox. He defended the 
operation on the grounds that it was intended to ‘build a picture’ of what was going on in Libya 
‘so we are able to get a clearer idea of what we are able to do in terms of helping the people of 
Libya’ (Chulov 2011a; The Western Mail 2011; Coventry Evening Telegraph 2011; Daily Post 
2011). The Independent on 6 March reported that International Development Secretary Andrew 
Mitchell had taken a similar line in a radio interview. There was no official comment, again 
because of the classified nature of the operation, from the Foreign Office or Ministry of 
Defence (Tapsfield 2011). However, these unofficial remarks indicate that government 
ministers were spinning the operation as intelligence-gathering (legitimate, tactical and routine) 
rather than a more sensitive event-shaping activity, clearly aiming to decrease the salience of 
the matter. The Prime Minister’s Office was approached by journalists but also declined to 
reveal details, merely adding that Hague had approved the operation ‘in the normal way’ 
(Wintour 2011). The government’s line was that this was ‘business as usual’. 
 Second, the lack of official information on the British side left the way clear for 
journalists to fill their copy with information gleaned from the Libyan side. Crucially, this 
emerged very early, adding to the sense that something was amiss. Top billing was given to a 
leaked telephone conversation between Richard Northern, the UK Ambassador to Libya, and 
a Libyan rebel leader, which took place in the immediate aftermath of the incident. In the short 
exchange, Northern apologized for the ‘misunderstanding’ and the leader chastised the 
‘mistake’ of sending the mission team in by helicopter at night (for example Chulov 2011a; 
Watt 2011b; Judd et al 2011; The Journal 2011; Wheeler and Newton Dunn 2011; Cecil 2011b; 
Dawar 2011; Radnedge 2011c). The interception and broadcast of their conversation was 
portrayed as another element of farce (Evening Times 2011) by playing into the hands of Libyan 
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leader Muammar Gaddafi. Covert action can thus work both ways for a government, when an 
operation is deemed to have gone wrong. On the one hand, information asymmetry can work 
in a government’s favour to stymy potential fiasco construction. On the other hand, it can also 
constrain a government’s ability to construct a compelling counter-narrative, allowing 
journalists to speculate and build new foundations on which to construct fiasco narratives. 
The third noteworthy pattern in the media coverage was the attribution of blame 
squarely on the shoulders of the Foreign Secretary, as the originator of the operation. Consistent 
with public policy fiascos, the press (from across the political spectrum) highlighted the 
avoidable nature of the failure by emphasizing poor planning, judgement, and scrutiny (see for 
example Wintour 2011; Hughes 2011b; Coughlin 2011b). As with previous covert actions 
which surfaced as perceived failures, Libya had created political space between the 
government’s intentions and the outcome, which was ruthlessly exploited by Hague’s 
opponents. Political leaders need to make meaning and to ‘fill this space with their own 
interpretation’ of the narrative (McConnell et al 2008: 602). Hague was trapped between the 
need for secrecy and the press’s traditional support for ‘brave’ and ‘heroic’ Special Forces at 
the expense of bumbling politicians. To Hague’s credit, he made a statement to the House of 
Commons and answered questions on the afternoon of 7 March about the Libya incident. 
Although secrecy impeded Hague from giving full details, he afforded himself enough latitude 
to ensure that this transfer of information was carefully framed to maintain government 
dominance of the narrative. In taking this step, Hague entered into a ‘frame contest’, which 
arises in the aftermath of crises and which affects beliefs and the relative importance 
individuals attach to those beliefs (Boin et al 2009: 82; Gershkoff and Kushner 2005: 526).  
The Foreign Secretary stated: ‘I authorised the dispatch of a small British diplomatic 
team to eastern Libya in uncertain circumstances, which we judged required protection, to build 
on these initial contacts and to assess the scope for closer diplomatic dialogue’ (Hague 2011: 
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cm643). Hague unsurprisingly offered no admission that the diplomatic team consisted of MI6 
and SAS personnel. After all, political actors are risk-averse and will not offer extra detail 
unless it suits them, or they are forced to (Edwards III and Wood 1999: 342). Hague continued 
by explaining that the team ‘was withdrawn yesterday after a serious misunderstanding about 
its role, leading to its temporary detention.’ These deliberately bland statements normalized the 
incident by framing it as part of everyday, rational and legitimate Foreign Office activity. He 
even attempted to sell the operation as having been partially successful: ‘this situation was 
resolved and [the team] was able to meet council president, Mr Abdul-Jalil. […] We intend to 
send further diplomats to eastern Libya in due course’ (Hague 2011: cm643).  
Contrary to Hague’s anodyne rendering of the operation, opposition politicians sought 
to frame the events somewhat differently. The public policy literature argues that ‘fiascos and 
prominent failures attract those interests that seek to capitalize on those failures’ (McConnell 
et al 2008: 601). Despite the national security implications, observers clearly sought to make 
political capital out of the Libya operation. Douglas Alexander, Labour’s Shadow Foreign 
Secretary, accused Hague of mishandling the affair: ‘does the Foreign Secretary accept that if 
some new neighbours moved into his street, the British public would be entitled to wonder 
whether he would introduce himself by ringing the doorbell, or instead choose to climb over 
the fence in the middle of the night?’ (Alexander 2011: cm646). A good joke always plays well 
with journalists and political sketch-writers, and this was widely reported. Journalists were 
encouraged in their attacks by accusations of ‘bungling’ and incompetence not only from 
opposition ministers, but some of Hague’s fellow Conservatives and members of the Coalition 
government. Former Liberal Democrat leader Menzies Campbell was widely reported to be 
behind open speculation about whether Hague still had the stomach for what he described as a 
‘very, very hard…very, very demanding job’ (see Bentley 2011; White 2011; Sun 2011; 
Sunday Business Post 2011; Heaven 2011). In the debate he asked: ‘Is it not clear that this 
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mission was ill conceived, poorly planned and embarrassingly executed?’ (Campbell 2011: 
cm649). Events were framed firstly as failure and secondly as avoidable, all overlaid with an 
element of farce. Hague, however, defended himself by taking ‘full ministerial responsibility’ 
(supporting the Downing Street line) and drew on Northern’s defence that this was a 
‘misunderstanding’ but nothing more sinister.  
The following days saw further attempts by Hague’s opponents to bolster the resonance 
of the fiasco narrative and undermine the Foreign Secretary. In this endeavor, parliamentary 
routine was on their side. Just two days after Hague’s statement and initial interrogation, Prime 
Minister’s Questions on 9 March provided a high-profile opportunity for the opposition leader 
Ed Miliband to land some telling punches on what he called the ‘fiasco’ of the government’s 
Libyan policy (Kirkup 2011). There was, he said, ‘a question of competence at the heart of this 
government’ (Churcher 2011). However, Cameron stood by Hague, calling him an ‘excellent’ 
minister and taking ‘full responsibility for everything that my government does’ (Kirkup 2011; 
Leicester Mercury 2011a; Metro 2011). Hague, it seemed, was not to be isolated or picked off, 
despite the fevered speculation (for instance Richards 2011). To help the embattled Foreign 
Secretary, Downing Street also briefed journalists that Hague had Cameron’s full support, 
along with the backing of fellow Cabinet ministers. There was, said the Prime Minister’s 
official spokesman, no plan for a Cabinet reshuffle ‘any time soon’ (Bentley 2011). These 
briefings emphasized the supposedly harmonious working relationship between Cameron and 
the three foreign affairs-related ministers, Hague, Fox and Mitchell (Kirkup 2011). Hague 
emerged from the episode bloodied and bowed, but was not beaten into a resignation. 
As the fallout continued in the media over the ensuing days the Daily Telegraph was a 
vocal but almost lone supporter of the Foreign Secretary. An article by Peter Oborne on 11 
March claimed Hague was the victim of a ‘smear campaign’ by rival politicians involved in a 
‘battle for power’. Oborne further charged that SAS operational planning was to blame, and 
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that it had been Hague’s constitutional duty to take responsibility for errors caused by the 
bungling of others. Oborne also questioned the idea that this was part of a series of failures in 
the government’s Libyan policy, especially regarding the evacuation of British nationals at the 
outbreak of hostilities (all in Oborne 2011). On 13 March Hague himself gave an interview to 
what was clearly his favourite newspaper, the Conservative-supporting Sunday Telegraph, in 
which he tried to end speculation about his future and Cameron’s support for him (see Bentley 
2011). This was extensively covered as Hague saying ‘I’ve still got my mojo’ (a direct response 
to Liberal Democrat criticisms) (Sun 2011) and that he would continue in office ‘for an 
extensive period of time’ (Heaven 2011). Hague’s biographer Jo-Anne Nadler added her view 
that Hague would not walk away from Cabinet and that he was only struggling in the job 
because the Cameron government was struggling to articulate its ambitions for British foreign 
policy (The Northern Echo 2011).   
Our analysis of media narratives reveals that, consistent with fiasco construction 
processes observed in the extant literature, socially and politically significant groups, having 
identified failure, attempted to highlight avoidable mistakes. Some in The Telegraph, for 
example, argued that ‘it is not the SAS that should hang its head in shame over this fiasco: it is 
the idiots who authorized it in the first place’ (Coughlin 2011a). Similarly, The Daily Mirror 
quoted an ex-SAS member who accused the mission of being ‘badly planned and under-
resourced’ (Hughes 2011a) and, by implication, avoidable. This is not necessarily fair, as it 
would have been the Director of Special Forces who advised Hague on feasibility. Yet the 
narrative ties in with a ‘lions led by donkeys’ frame, emphasizing the romance and mythologies 
surrounding Special Forces and MI6, who are generally held in higher regard than supposedly 
amateurish, blundering politicians (for a typically hagiographic example shortly after the 
failure see Harding 2011).  
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Libya, however, did not become a full-blown fiasco – in the technical sense – seemingly 
for three reasons. First, journalists interpreted the operation as a visible and immediate failure, 
but did not interpret it as sufficiently consequential to dig for inflammatory details over a 
prolonged period. The narrative that came to dominate was that the Libyan venture lacked the 
costly and very visible consequences associated with decisions as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
(see Ricks 2006; Bovens and ‘t Hart 2016: 655 and 660-661). Had a covert operation turned 
out similarly in Iraq as opposed to Libya, one suspects the fallout would have been much more 
severe because a prior narrative of policy failure would already have been in place. Unlike Iraq, 
the Libyan venture was not deemed serious enough – and the overall strategy not contentious 
enough – to warrant an inquiry, which might have reignited discussion and led to post-hoc 
fiasco construction. Hague’s narrative in fact came to be accepted as the official line, an 
important indicator of success in this kind of narrative contestation (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 
55).  
For example, the following year’s Intelligence and Security Committee annual report 
limited formal criticism to a paragraph which blamed the botched operation on time pressures 
and a lack of planning (Intelligence and Security Committee 2012: 19). Likewise, the Cabinet 
Office’s lesson learning retrospective reduced the incident to a ‘serious misunderstanding’ 
which was quickly resolved. In doing so it almost repeated Hague’s words verbatim (National 
Security Adviser 2011: 9-10). By the time Hague stepped down as Foreign Secretary, Britain’s 
Libya policy was hotly contested, but his March 2011 venture had seemingly been forgotten, 
even by close observers. Looking back on his record in politics, Hague was able to claim that 
Libya had not caused any divisions between the senior Conservative members of the Coalition 
government. Furthermore, he said: ‘I don’t think I made any calamitous mistake on any issue’ 
(Economist 2015). He would have been hard pushed to substantiate these claims had the Libyan 
episode been worked up into a credible fiasco narrative. 
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Second, the short-lived attempt by journalists to create a fiasco narrative is in part 
explained by the structuring effects of shifting media agendas. Soon after the story broke, a 
large earthquake and tsunami struck Japan, killing around 20,000 people and causing a nuclear 
accident. The next eight weeks also included a Royal Wedding in the UK and the death of 
Osama bin Laden. Media attention can only last so long and the agenda was soon overtaken by 
other – equally dramatic – events, ones with obvious global political consequences that made 
for better news stories. It would require a separate article to theorize the association between 
commercial media decisions and fiasco construction. However, the evidence from our case 
study suggests that whilst the saliency of Hague’s Libyan venture was very high for a brief 
period, more sense of intrigue or consequence – not to mention a whiff of scandal, cover-up or 
other wrongdoing – was required for stakeholders to continue to invest resources in chasing 
down elusive facts about wat had transpired far away in the Libyan desert outside Benghazi.  
With or without the agglomeration of more newsworthy stories, this fiasco construction 
might not have taken off for the third reason: the requirements of operational secrecy hindered 
the media’s ability to establish the facts of the matter. The case did involve the transfer of 
information via parliament, which challenged the executive’s usual monopoly over such 
matters. However, official information was limited and framed blandly, thus taking the sting 
out of the fiasco narratives. Observers lacked even basic data on the operation to be able to 
explain agents’ behaviour and to apportion blame. The Guardian, for instance, ended up 
turning its attention to the ‘arrogant’ government silence (Norton-Taylor 2011). Moreover, the 
operation came amidst a fast-moving civil war, part of the Arab Spring, which was ushering in 
a period of intense global uncertainty reminiscent of the collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe. At the grand strategic level, the government had secured bipartisan support for its 
actions in Libya, including the need to protect civilians in the civil war. Negotiations were 
already underway regarding no-fly zones, and just two weeks later MPs overwhelmingly voted 
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in favour of military action to protect civilians. The press supported these key decisions. This 
strategic consensus clearly sapped the willingness even of Hague’s many opponents to continue 
to try to land political punches on him. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our investigation of Hague’s Libyan venture highlights the multiple ingredients required for 
the successful construction of a fiasco narrative: politics, power, intent and contingency all play 
key parts. Our case study supports a well-known finding in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis 
(Houghton, 2007: 25) that information is power and the main currency of foreign policy 
narratives. The foreign policy marketplace, as Baum and Potter (2008: 42) put it, ‘is driven 
primarily by the distribution of the key market commodity’ – information – among the 
policymakers, media and public opinion. Our contribution allows us to add to this argument by 
showing precisely why it is that the emergence of an accountability forum within which 
information can circulate is crucial, yet also one of the hardest things to achieve for interested 
stakeholders. Information, especially in covert action, overwhelmingly favours the policy-
makers.  
Our first conclusion is, therefore, that lack of access to information is the prime reason 
why a perceived covert action failure, and a national security failure more broadly, will not 
easily result in the successful construction of a fiasco narrative. As the Libya case study reveals 
starkly, it is very difficult to construct covert action fiascos. Secrecy, government monopoly 
over information, and the problematic ontologies of identifying policy goals impede even those 
operations deemed to have failed from becoming talked about as fiascos. This creates a 
fascinating paradox considered in this article: public policy failures are more likely to become 
emplotted as fiascos despite being less controversial and less risky, simply because they are 
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more visible and stakeholders have more information ready to hand. Even short-lived, failed 
fiasco constructions such as that explored in this article offer vital information on the subjective 
nature of fiasco narratives.  
Our second conclusion is that the role of secrecy is determinative when evaluating 
covert action and yet is only loosely acknowledged and accounted for in existing attempts at 
mid-range theoretical explanations of policy failure. This article has not sought to develop its 
own theory of secrecy, but has introduced the idea of secrecy into scholarly debates as a point 
for discussion moving forward. Our article has revealed that the discourse surrounding covert 
action failures exhibit different emphases and some special characteristics compared to ‘overt’ 
or routine foreign policy activity. However, we are dealing with differences of magnitude not 
of kind, hence the urgent need for attention to the idea of secrecy in the fiascos literature. From 
our evidence, we suggest that secrecy can be a government’s best defence against fiasco 
construction. Yet once commentators latch onto covert action mistakes, elites are suddenly 
placed in a difficult position. They cannot fully defend themselves without undermining official 
secrecy and/or potentially damaging delicate diplomatic relations with other states, or 
criticizing Special Forces and the intelligence services, which have long been romanticized in 
the public imagination. We argue, therefore, that attempts at fiasco construction offer insight 
into the power relations at play in attempts to construct and control a narrative. The study of 
covert action fiasco narratives is especially well placed to deliver rare insights into the most 
secret of policy spaces. 
Our third conclusion is that secrecy seriously complicates lesson learning. Many studies, 
in asserting their policy relevance, argue that opening policy-making to a genuine contest of 
ideas is the best way to prevent fiasco – and failure more broadly (Bovens and ‘t Hart 2016: 
662). Yet covert action is the one area of policy least likely to be subject to democratic debate, 
even in an era of increasing official oversight and growing public interest in foreign policy. At 
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the same time, blame games and political point scoring associated with fiascos, exaggerated 
when a controversial covert action is under the microscope, can obscure relevant lessons 
altogether (Gray 1998).  
Our fourth conclusion is that, from the study of covert action successes and failures, 
policy-makers can learn vital things about the construction of blame avoidance under the rubric 
of ‘message management’. This gives lesson learning a vital new twist from that generally on 
offer in the literature, because policy-makers learn as much from blame avoidance, frame 
contestation, and the political construction of success and failure as they do from rational 
evidence-based prescriptions. It is all too easy for policy-makers to assume that covert action 
will stay secret; they therefore tend to underestimate the political implications of disclosure. 
Governments communicate all sorts of messages about policies daily, but there seems little 
energy devoted to reflecting on the whys, wherefores, pros and cons of different types of 
message management under routine and crisis conditions. Studying the construction of covert 
action fiascos lays bare these practical challenges to policy-makers by showing the obvious 
potential for fiascos scholarship to impact on policy. This is no straightforward task and will 
require further bridges to be built between the worlds of policy and academe. Cross-fertilization 
of research and experiences between academics and foreign policy-makers, in line with the 
revivified research agenda of which this article is a part, will perhaps encourage governments 
to better consider the political ramifications of disclosure before sanctioning covert actions 
which, in an increasingly digital world, are ever less likely to remain secret.   
 
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at [link to source – publisher will add doi at 
proof] 
 
Notes on Contributors 
25 
 
 
Rory Cormac is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of 
Nottingham, UK. 
Oliver Daddow is an Assistant Professor in British Politics and Security at the University of 
Nottingham, UK. 
 
Rory.Cormac@nottingham.ac.uk; Oliver.Daddow@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The authors would like to thank Jon Moran, Kai Oppermann, Kelly Smith, as well as the four 
anonymous journal reviewers, whose comments greatly helped sharpen up the final piece. 
 
Notes 
1 We are grateful to one of the journal reviewers for drawing our attention to the 
domestic/international point. 
2 The hostage rescue was a secret military operation not a covert action, and it is debatable 
whether the Iran-Contra affair, often labelled a scandal, constitutes a fiasco (the latter hinges 
on interpretations of programmatic success). The differences between them lie beyond the 
scope of this article, but are referred to here as they are relevant to the core theme of secrecy.  
3 The source data and references are found in the online appendix. 
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